ИПИ Библиотека

As diverse as the papers presented in this volume may seem at first glance, all of them touch on two characteristic themes of James Buchanan’s work: the respect for individual sovereignty and the threat of monopoly power on the rights of the individual.

In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt says, “As opposed to more extreme and more utopian libertarians, [Buchanan] well understands that in our world it takes a state to defend the individual from the state. Buchanan, therefore, is not an anarchist but, rather, what may be called a ‘reluctant anarchist’ who accepts both that the state is the greatest threat to individual sovereignty and that without some statelike monopoly, individual sovereignty cannot be protected.”

The twenty-six essays included in Federalism, Liberty, and the Law are grouped into these categories:
1.The Analytics of Federalism
2.Federalism and Freedom
3.Liberty, Man, and the State
4.The Constitution of Markets
5.Economists, Efficiency, and the Law
6.Law, Money, and Crime

The central issue that unites the pieces in this volume is monopoly power and its control. As a libertarian, Buchanan sees government as the greatest threat—and also the greatest protector—of individual liberties.

“Fiscal relations between central and subordinate units of government have become an important problem are in the United States during the last two decades. Increasing attention has been, and is being, given to the more practical policy proposals aimed at accomplishing specific short-run objectives.”

James M. Buchanan

In 1986 James M. Buchanan (1919-2012) was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Universally respected as one of the founders of the “public choice” school of economics, he is the author of numerous books and hundreds of articles in the areas of public finance, public choice, constitutional economics and economic philosophy. He is best known for such works as The Calculus of Consent, The Limits of Liberty, The Power to Tax, and The Reason of Rules. Buchanan has devoted himself to the study of the contractual and constitutional basis for the theory of economic and political decision making.

See also at Econlib: the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics entry on Buchanan