This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory.
The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan’s book-length works such as The Calculus of Consent or The Reason of Rules (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund’s The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan) are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioral models to government. But Buchanan’s shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What’s more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice.
In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings:
2.Public Choice and Its Critics
7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, “Read in conjunction with the other parts of the ‘Collected Works,’ these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects.”
James M. Buchanan
In 1986 James M. Buchanan (1919-2012) was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Universally respected as one of the founders of the “public choice” school of economics, he is the author of numerous books and hundreds of articles in the areas of public finance, public choice, constitutional economics and economic philosophy. He is best known for such works as The Calculus of Consent, The Limits of Liberty, The Power to Tax, and The Reason of Rules. Buchanan has devoted himself to the study of the contractual and constitutional basis for the theory of economic and political decision making.
See also at Econlib: the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics entry on Buchanan