This volume consists of two comments on Sachs' paper, "Russia's Struggle with Stabilization: Conceptual Issues and Evidence," followed by a summary of the floor discussion on the paper. Both comments analyze the Sachs model and its policy implications, including implications for foreign aid. The first comment discusses two key questions in deciding whether Russia had or has a chance to stabilize. The first question concerns the choice of a transparent and easily monitored commitment that will shock the economy back from the bad equilibrium to the good equilibrium. To fulfill this role, the author recommends a general price liberalization complemented by monetary reform. The second is how close Russia was and is to fixing the fundamentals. In the Russian context, it means limiting monetary expansion. The second comment disagrees with Sachs' view that to stabilize Russia's economy, it simply needs to move back into a good equilibrium. Some of the structural characteristics of the Russian economy and the political system make it particularly difficult for the government to cut public spending. Firstly, the structure of the governments is extremely susceptible to lobbyists' pressure. Secondly, the social safety net is underdeveloped and would be unable to cope with the high unemployment that is likely to result from the stabilization.