A large measure of consensus exists about the substantive content of successful economic policy reform—macroeconomic discipline, microeconomic liberalization, and participation in the global economy—that is needed for an economy to enter the modern world. There is much less consensus on the political conditions necessary to sustain meaningful economic reform. Editor John Williamson commissioned 13 case studies for countries as diverse as Australia, Chile, and Poland from "technopols" who played leading roles in implementing the policy reforms. Each author focuses on the political and institutional factors that shaped policy choices and outcomes. This volume contains the case studies and a synthesis of findings and other policy implications by Williamson and University of California at San Diego political scientist Stephan Haggard. Other distinguished experts, including Inter-American Development Bank President Enrique Iglesias and Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, contribute independent appraisals of the political economy of reform in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.
The most dramatic event of the early 1990s was the collapse of the Soviet empire and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But more important for many people around the world was the dramatic change in economic philosophy and policy that occurred in dozens of countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s, including several former communist countries. The change was the major shift toward and acceptance of what has been called the Washington consensus: orthodox macroeconomic policy, deregulation, trade liberalization, privatization and generally greater reliance on market forces and integration with the world economy. The process has seen some setbacks, but it continues.
Williamson gathered a number of participants in this economic shift from 15 countries so-called technopolis, i.e., persons trained in economics who later became politicians and policymakers. He asked them to reflect on several questions concerning their experiences. Why did the Washington consensus come to be accepted where its elements had previously been rejected in favor of statism in various degrees? How were many programs that would hurt some segments of society, at least in the short run, made politically acceptable? Where the reforms were not fully consolidated, what were the obstacles and the reasons for setbacks? The results, published with commentary by specialists in both the economics and the politics of economic reform, make fascinating reading. - Richard Cooper, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1994
John Williamson
Dr. John Williamson is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics since 1981. He was on leave as Chief Economist for South Asia at the World Bank during 1996-99, economics professor at Pontifica Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (1978-81), University of Warwick (1970-77), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1967, 1980), University of York (1963-68), and Princeton University (1962-63); Adviser to the International Monetary Fund (1972-74); and Economic Consultant to the UK Treasury (1968-70). He is author or editor of numerous studies on international monetary and developing world debt issues, including The Crawling Band as an Exchange Rate Regime (1996), What Role for Currency Boards? (1995), Estimating Equilibrium Exchange Rates (1994), The Political Economy of Policy Reform (1993), Economic Consequences of Soviet Dis-Integration (1993), Trade and Payments After Soviet Disintegration (1992), From Soviet Disunion to Eastern Economic Community? with Oleh Havrylyshyn (1991), Currency Convertibility in Eastern Europe (1991), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (1990), and Targets and Indicators: A Blueprint for the International Coordination of Economic Policy with Marcus Miller (1987).